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Mining failure · July 4, 2015

July 2015: pools mining on an invalid block

When the BIP66 soft fork took effect, a small miner produced an invalid block, and large pools that did not check blocks before building on them extended it. Two short invalid chains followed.

Trigger
BIP66 reached 950 of 1,000 blocks
First fork
Jul 4, 2015, 02:10–03:50 UTC, 6 blocks
Second fork
Jul 5, 2015, about 21:30–23:40 UTC, 3 blocks
Affected
Bitcoin Core 0.9.4 or older, SPV wallets
Advice at the time
Wait 30 extra confirmations

Timeline (UTC)

  1. Jul 4, 2015 · early morning UTCBIP66 signalling reaches 950 of the last 1,000 blocks. From now on, blocks with the old version number are invalid.
  2. 02:10–03:50 UTCA small miner that had not upgraded mines an old-version block. Pools that build on new blocks before validating them extend it: six invalid blocks in all.
  3. Jul 5, 2015 · about 21:30–23:40 UTCIt happens again: three more invalid blocks.
  4. Following daysbitcoin.org publishes an alert advising users of older software and light wallets to wait for 30 extra confirmations, and miners to validate blocks or switch pools.

What broke

About half of the network’s hashrate was “SPV mining”: starting on the next block as soon as a new block header arrived, without first checking the block. When a non-upgraded miner produced a block that broke the new BIP66 rule, F2Pool and AntPool built on top of it.

How it was fixed

Nodes that enforced the rule, Bitcoin Core 0.9.5 and later, ignored the invalid blocks, and the valid chain overtook them. Light wallets and old nodes, which trust the longest chain without checking it, briefly followed the wrong one.

Why it matters

A soft fork is only as safe as the miners’ validation. The episode showed that skipping checks to save seconds can put light-wallet users on an invalid chain.

A note on the data

These blocks were invalid under Bitcoin’s rules, so they are not in the stale-block data set used on this site, which records valid blocks that lost out.

Sources

← All incidents, vulnerabilities and the stale-block record