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Bitcoin Legacy Planner

Plan it. Test it. Leave no single point of failure.

Describe your bitcoin setup with labels only, see what a fire, a burglary or a death would do to it, and print a letter for your family and a separate location sheet. About 15 minutes.

Private by design. Never type backup words, keys or passwords here; the page refuses them. This page is not allowed to make any network request, so nothing you type can leave your device, and nothing is stored unless you save an encrypted file. Closing the tab erases it.

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Prefer a computer that is not online at all? Download the offline file

bitcoin-legacy-planner-offline.zip (38 KB). It holds one file, bitcoin-legacy-planner-offline.html, the same planner with nothing to load: unzip it and open it in a browser, on any computer, even with no connection at all.

Check you have the genuine file before you use it. SHA-256 of the zip: 83bb374db416ca87713c35c6a39ef31f66bf3463ae6b45fb8ba9bd62c3cade7a
SHA-256 of the HTML file inside: 03564bab16cb8374ecd92ffe2e1af09af6265059f5f65118fb059ef938398402
Mac or Linux: shasum -a 256 FILE · Windows: certutil -hashfile FILE SHA256

How the checks work

What does the stress test actually check?

For each wallet it asks one question again and again: can this group of people, with the places they can open, reach enough backups (and the passphrase and configuration file, when needed) to spend? It asks it today; after your death (heirs and helpers, plus places the estate can open); while you are unable to act (no estate access); after each place is lost; after each person drops out; for a burglar who empties one place; and for each person acting alone.

Why two documents?

The letter is built without any place data and the location sheet without any wallet data, so neither can contain what belongs to the other. The letter also refuses to print while one of its fields names one of your places. A thief would need both, plus the backups themselves.

What are the codes like A1-1?

A short label for each physical item: wallet A, key 1, copy 1 (AP = passphrase copy, AC = configuration file copy). Write the code on the envelope, never the words. The letter says which codes are needed; the sheet says where each code is.

What can it not know?

Only what you enter. It cannot see your real backups, check that they are correct or complete, judge local law, or protect a device that is already compromised. A clean finding means "no weakness in what you described", not "safe".

Is anything stored or sent?

No. The page keeps the plan in memory and its security policy blocks every network request. The optional plan file is encrypted on your device (AES-256-GCM, key from your password with PBKDF2-SHA256, 600,000 rounds) and leaves out place names.